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Abstract:
We assess the quality of the HRS’s measures of out-of-pocket medical spending and health insurance premia,
both in the “core interviews” and in the “exit interview” data. We provide detailed evidence on the quality of
the HRS insurance premia data, and we compare the HRS exit data to exit data in the MCBS. We document
how changes in survey questions, including the introduction of “unfolding brackets,” aﬀect the HRSmeasures.
We document what we believe are errors in the HRS imputations and provide some suggestions for improving
the accuracy of some imputed variables. Overall, we ﬁnd the HRS data to be of high quality. However, we
believe that many interesting variables in the HRS are under-utilized because users must perform imputations
themselves.
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1 Overview
The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) contains an unparalleled variety of measures of the well-being of the
elderly. In this paper, we assess the quality of theHRS’smeasures of out-of-pocketmedical spending and health
insurance premia, both in the “core interviews” and in the “exit interview” data. We pay particular attention
to issues of data imputation.
The HRS data are novel in many dimensions. One of these is the use of “unfolding brackets,” where indi-
viduals who cannot give a point response to a question (such as how much they spent on medical care) are
allowed to respond that the quantity in question was above some values and below others. A second dimen-
sion in which the HRS is novel is in its use of exit interviews, where data on recently deceased individuals is
collected from their children or other relatives. These interviews provide information on a variety of topics,
including late-in-life medical spending, the value of the deceased’s estate, and bequests.
The HRS has been used extensively in the study of aging. RAND’s coding, imputing, and cleaning of the
HRS data has led to an easy-to-use, high-quality dataset. Our personal experience is that RAND has done a
fantastic job of creating recoded HRS variables that are both well-imputed and consistent over time. RAND’s
recoded dataset is so accessible that it can be used by advanced undergraduates andMaster’s students, attract-
ing young scholars to aging-related topics.
However, RAND recodes a relatively small share of the variables in theHRS. An informal perusal of journals
suggests that very few of the variables not coded by RANDhave been used in published research. This is for two
reasons. First, RAND has coded the most important variables. Second, the diﬀiculty of working with variables
not coded by RAND has deterred many researchers from using them. In our opinion, there is much that can be
learned from the data not coded by RAND. For the intrepid, the data not processed by RAND provides fertile
ground for research.
We thus focus on the measurement of variables that have not been cleaned and recoded by RAND. Some
of these variables have been imputed by HRS for some years, while others have not. We document that overall
the quality of these variables is still high. This is of interest because many of the variables not coded by RAND
use more complex survey methodologies (such as for the exit interviews).
JeremyMcCauley is the corresponding author.
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However, we note several problems with the data. Perhaps most important, we document several problems
with the imputations done by the HRS. The source data are of high quality, but the imputation procedures can
be improved, and in some places we believe there are errors in the imputations.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, we provide detailed evidence on the quality of insur-
ance premia data in the HRS. To the best of our knowledge these data have not been evaluated before. Second,
we provide detailed evidence on the quality of the medical spending (and other) data for those recently de-
ceased that were collected in the “exit interviews.” To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to compare the
HRS exit data to exit data in the Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS). Third, we update and expand
on the estimates shown in Goldman, Zissimopoulos, and Lu (2011). As described in Goldman, Zissimopoulos,
and Lu (2011) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2016a), the HRS data match up well relative to other surveys
such as the MCBS and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS); see also Hurd and Rohwedder (2009).
We conﬁrm their ﬁndings. Fourth, we provide some suggestions for data imputation.We hope that our sugges-
tions, along with the documentation provided by the HRS (Cao 2001) and RAND (Chien et al. 2014), alongside
the work of Marshall, Skinner, and McGarry (2011) and Fahle, McGarry, and Skinner (2016), will encourage
researchers to explore the HRS data beyond the RAND dataset.
2 Key Findings
• The HRS has high quality data for the variables we consider. For example, the medical spending data line
up well relative to the MCBS. We document lower reported Medicaid recipiency in the HRS relative to
the MCBS, suggesting modest underreporting of Medicaid recipiency in the HRS. For insurance premia,
the match between the HRS, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and the MCBS is not quite as
good, but it is not obvious whether the problem lies with the HRS, MEPS, or with the MCBS.
• The medical spending questions in the HRS have changed over time, especially in the earliest waves. Al-
though this can hinder comparisons across waves, for the most part the changes have improved the quality
of the data. For example, prior to 2002, respondents were given ﬂexibility in how they could respond to
certain insurance questions. After 2002, however, respondents were told to report insurance payments per
month. This likely improved the quality of their answers.
• Non-response rates are fairly high formany variables, including insurance premia. Issues of either partial or
complete non-response (coded as “don’t know” or “refused”) are especially serious in the exit interviews.
• The HRS addresses these issues of non-response by using “unfolding brackets” and imputations. We assess
the quality of the HRS’ imputations of health insurance premia. Overall, the HRS uses good procedures
that balance the need for accuracy with the need for robustness. However, we ﬁnd what we believe to be
errors, some ofwhich are serious. In particular, we document apparent errors in the 2002 and 2004 insurance
premia imputations. Perhaps more seriously, the HRS no longer imputes data, and RAND only imputes a
share of the data, leaving researchers to do any remaining imputations on their own. Whether individual
researchers do the imputations carefully or not is unknown.
3 Key recommendations
• Overall, the HRS contains extremely high quality panel data, providing measures of key variables that are
comparable over time. For this reason, we do not recommend any changes to the survey questionnaire.
• We recommend that a trusted source, such as RAND, continue to clean, impute and recode as much of the
HRS data as possible.
• We document errors in the HRS imputations, and recommend that some of these speciﬁc problemswith the
imputations be addressed. These problems are suﬀiciently serious that it would be better to remove some
of the imputed variables than to leave them on the HRS website as currently constructed.
• Many variables in theHRS are not imputed at all. For example, insurance premia after 2004 are not imputed.
We recommend that all variables with unfolding brackets be imputed by a trusted source, such as RAND.
• The imputations should satisfy basic accounting identities. For example, the total value of the estate be-
queathed to all children should equal the sum of the bequests to each child. Basic identities like this should
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hold in the HRS imputations, but in many cases they do not. We recommend exploiting these “adding up”
conditions in the construction of the data.
• We recommend that the HRS ask distinct questions about pharmacuetical expenditures borne by the cus-
tomer and those covered by other sources.
• We reiterate two of Venti (2011) recommendations. First, the HRS should be linked to administrative Medi-
caid data. We document modest underreporting of Medicaid recipiency in the HRS – using administrative
data should circumvent this problem. Adding the administrative data would also introduce new variables,
such as the dollar value of Medicaid beneﬁts, that should stimulate new research on Medicaid. Second, we
recommend that the imputation procedures exploit the HRS’s panel dimension.
4 Introduction to theHRSMedical SpendingData
We begin by brieﬂy describing the medical spending questions in the HRS, and the way in which point re-
sponses are extracted from incomplete data.
4.1 Medical SpendingQuestions in theHRS
While alive, survey respondents answer a rich variety of medical spending questions in the HRS “core” inter-
views. Once they die, spouses, children, or other decedents are asked about their medical spending in “exit”
interviews.
For researchers doing longitudinal studies it is essential that questions remain comparable across waves. In
this section, we summarize how the HRS medical spending questions have evolved over time. Although the
changes have generally improved the quality of the data, they have also reduced the comparability of medical
spending across waves, especially in early years.
The medical expense information for wave 1 (1992) of the HRS is limited to insurance premia. Moreover, the
insurance premiumquestion only refers to insurance purchaseddirectly froman insurance company or through
a membership organization such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). It does not include
employee contributions to employer-provided insurance plans. Given that the information is incomplete, we
do not use wave 1 data in our analyses.
The set of medical spending questions expanded signiﬁcantly in wave 2:
• The insurance premia question includes employee contributions to employer-provided insurance plans and
also insurance directly purchased or through membership such as the AARP.
• The respondent is asked whether the individual had any hospital stays, nursing home stays, or visits to a
doctor. If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the respondent is then asked both the total cost and
out-of-pocket cost for the visit or stay.
• The respondent is asked about whether the individual purchases medicines prescribed by a doctor. If the
individual did purchase medicine, they are asked how much the medicines cost per year. It is not clear
whether the cost measure refers to the cost paid by the individual or what the pharmacy charges the indi-
vidual and the insurer. Nevertheless, we use this variable to determine drug costs. We recommend that in
future waves the HRS ask distinct questions about the drugs costs borne by the customer and those covered
by other sources.
The questions in wave 2 can be combined to compute measures of total out-of-pocket expenses and total insur-
ance costsl. However, a number of expenditures are still excluded. The costs (both out-of-pocket and total) of
outpatient surgery, dental expenses, in-home care, and special facilities and services are not included.Medicare
HMO insurance costs are missing as well. We thus exclude the wave 2 data as well.
From wave 3 onwards, out-of-pocket costs are clariﬁed to include the amount paid for doctors, hospitals,
nursing homes, outpatient surgery, dental expenses, in-homemedical care, special facilities and services. In ad-
dition, the procedure for determining insurance costs changes over waves 3 through 5. The insurance premium
variable is now the sum of premia for all employer-provided insurance, Medicare HMO plans, supplemental
plans, private/AARP/professional coverage, and long-term care plans.
Data for the oldest cohorts in the HRS were originally collected in a distinct but similar survey called the
Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD). The ﬁrst two waves of the AHEAD did not coincide
3
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated








































French et al. DEGRUYTER
with the ﬁrst two waves of the HRS; in 1998 the two surveys were merged. In wave 1 (1993) of the AHEAD, we
can determine out-of-pocket costs. The out-of-pocket costs include the costs of nursing home stays as well as
hospital and doctor bills and any other medical or dental expenses in the last 12 months. We infer that drug
costs are included in this measure, although respondents are not asked explicitly about drug costs. AHEAD
wave 1 also asks the respondents if they had insurance policies in addition to Medicare, including long-term
care policies, and how much they paid yearly for such policies. From this we can determine the respondent’s
insurance expenses. Wave 1 is not used in the this paper, however, because the sources of health insurance are
incomplete.
In the 1995 wave of the AHEAD, imputation procedures for total costs, and out-of-pocket costs, insurance
costs, drug costs, and medical costs are the same as in waves 3 through 5 of the HRS. This allows us to combine
the AHEAD data for 1995/1996 with the HRS data for 1996.
In the analysis below we assess the accuracy of the economic measures contained in these questions, using
questions that are broadly comparable across waves. All amounts, unless otherwise stated, are deﬂated to 2014
dollars using the PCE price index.
4.2 UnfoldingBrackets and Imputation in theHRS
Non-response is a problem in almost every survey. Non-response can take multiple forms. People may refuse
to participate in the survey at all, or they might participate but not answer certain questions, giving “don’t
know” (DK) or “refused” (RF) as an answer. The HRS has done a remarkable job in addressing both issues. The
rate of participation in the HRS is much higher than in related surveys, including the aging surveys for other
countries, such as ELSA and SHARE, and attrition is modest.
Many of the questions asked in the HRS are personal in nature, and many are diﬀicult to answer. Medical
spending questions belong to both categories. Many people may not know how much they paid in medical
bills, as they are paid only intermittently. Many people may also be uncomfortable discussing their health care
needs. For this reason a high share of all respondents respond either DK or RF when asked about their medical
spending. To address this issue, the HRS uses “unfolding brackets.”1 Respondents not providing point values
for their medical spending are asked “Did it amount to less than $_______, more than $_______, or what?” If
respondents report a higher value, they will be asked a new question about whether their spending was more
or less than a higher value. This procedure ultimately identiﬁes a range of possible values.
In the early waves, the HRS replaced incomplete or missing values with imputations for many variables.
See Cao (2001) for a description of these procedures. However, in more recent waves these imputations have
ceased.
Many of these variables are now imputed by RAND. Chien et al. (2014) catalogue the variables available in
the RAND data, and describe how the variables are imputed. Our personal experience is that RAND does an
extremely good job of coding the data. Furthermore, the data are well-documented and the procedures used
to construct the data are also reasonably well-explained. Our assessment is based upon the fact that we have
coded many variables ourselves, and have compared many of the variables we have coded ourselves to the
same variables in the RAND data. Although there are sometimes discrepancies between our own coding and
RAND’s coding of the data, they are minor and our procedures are not necessarily better. The only error we
have ever discovered in RAND’s coding was quickly corrected after contacting them. For this reason in our
own work we rely on RAND’s coding of the data whenever possible.
It should be noted, however, that RAND codes only a subset of the data. An example particularly relevant
to this study is that RAND does not code or impute insurance data or data from the exit interviews. In general,
many of the variables that are most diﬀicult to impute are not imputed by RAND.
For earlier waves, additional imputations are available in the HRS itself. Up until 2000, the HRS released
“Exit Imputations” ﬁles, which imputed all missing values in the exit data. Since that time, the exit data are no
longer imputed. Likewise, HRS imputed many of the variables in the core ﬁles until 2004. Below we document
some problems with the HRS imputations of insurance premia and estate dispositions. But our key message is
not that HRS did a bad job in the imputations. On the contrary, the HRS, with its expert staﬀ, mostly did a very
good job. The most serious problem with the HRS imputations is that they are no longer being done by the
expert HRS staﬀ. Because many researchers lack the resources and/or expertise to impute the data themselves,
this limits the use of the data. Perhaps even more seriously, researchers who impute the data themselves may
not do it correctly. That there are issues in the coding, cleaning, and imputation of the data when done by
experts shows how diﬀicult the process is. Furthermore, there is little professional oversight of data coding
and imputation. The academic refereeing process is useful for vetting the quality of ideas, but not as useful for
assessing the details of data processing. The fact that the cleaning, coding, and imputation of HRS data has
been delegated to the research community, with little if any oversight, is not reassuring.
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We perform very little topcoding. Fahle, McGarry, and Skinner (2016) do more in the way of topcoding.
However, these diﬀerences seem fairly minor: relatively few observations have values of medical spending that
are clearly implausible. For example, topcoding medical spending at $200,000 reduces mean medical spending
in the elderly DeNardi, French, and Jones (2010) sample by 2%. This certainly does not mean that measurement
error is unimportant: it just means that it is not at all obvious how to detect it.
5 Medical Insurance Premia
In addition to being queried about their out-of-pocket expenditures on deductibles and co-pays for medical
care, respondents in the HRS are asked about their out-of-pocket expenditures on insurance premia. Although
RAND imputes missing data and recodes out-of-pocket medical spending on co-pays and deductibles, it does
not do the same for insurance payments. The HRS provides imputations only for 2002 and 2004. Below we
report estimated insurance premia, using our own imputation procedures, and describe how the estimated
premia have changed as the survey questions evolved. We also document problems with the HRS imputation
procedures.
Individuals in the HRS are questioned about the diﬀerent types of health insurance that they might have.
Respondents are also asked about how much is spent on each type of insurance. The insurance types that
respondents are asked about change from wave to wave, as do the reporting methods. These changes are dis-
cussed in detail below.
Prior to 2002 (wave 6) we drop observations that report having health insurance, but respond with DK or
RF when asked how much was spent on insurance premia. We ﬁnd that this generally amounts to 10–20%
of observations. From 2002 onward, these respondents are directed to unfolding bracket questions. For those
who respond to the unfolding brackets, we impute insurance premia data ourselves. Our imputation method
is simple. First, we ﬁnd the upper and lower bounds on the premium implied by the bracket the respondent
selected. We then give the respondent the spending of a “donor” individual who gave a point response that fell
in the respondent’s bracketed range. Our procedure is thus a hot deck method, where the cells to be matched
include everyonewith premia in the desired range.Wedrop thosewhodid not give a point or unfolding bracket
response.
5.1 Comparing Insurance Premia in theHRS,MEPS, andMCBS
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 shows mean insurance premia in the HRS by year for the age 65+ population.
To make the results comparable to the MEPS and the MCBS, premia for Medicare HMO or other Medicare and
long-term care insurance plans are not included as these do no exist in the MEPS and MCBS. The table begins
in 1996 because, as discussed in Section 4.1, the medical spending questions used by the HRS prior to 1996 are
not comparable to those used in later waves.
Table 1: Insurance Premia for 65+, Comparison.
Year HRS data MEPS data MCBS data
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Panel A: Unconditional (whole population)
 1996 734 771 – 808 827
 1998 778 821 – 872 882
 2000 728 774 – 937 948
 2002 1194 1258 739 828 1123 1132
 2004 1286 1352 868 1056 1130 1143
 2006 1110 1160 707 847 1136 1157
 2008 1161 1241 617 691 1202 1198
 2010 1197 1291 607 703 1128 1152
 2012 1103 1186 766 904 – –
Panel B: Conditional on positive premia spending
 1996 1725 1768 – 1373 1398
 1998 1924 1896 – 1603 1637
 2000 2080 2092 – 1643 1667
 2002 2407 2406 2280 2343 1835 1873
 2004 2617 2611 2736 2968 1944 1965
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 2006 2496 2494 2500 2566 1788 1816
 2008 2801 2848 2376 2438 1871 1919
 2010 2989 3013 2386 2435 1832 1848
 2012 2927 2881 2752 2795 – –
Mean annual insurance premia, 2014 dollars, excluding Medicare HMO and long-term care insurance premia. MCBS estimates taken
from De Nardi et al. (2016c).
The next two columns show premia from the MEPS, and the ﬁnal two show premia from the MCBS. The
MCBS andMEPS both capture individual payments for employer-provided and other private insurance premia,
but exclude long-term care,MedicareHMOor otherMedicare payments. The three surveys should thus capture
similar types of insurance premia. Appendix provides more background on theMEPS andMCBS, and the data
that these surveys capture.
Column 1 of Table 1 shows unweighted mean premia for the HRS while column 2 shows the same premia
after adjusting for populationweights. Columns 3 and 4 show unweighted and population-weightedmeans for
the MEPS, and columns 4 and 5 show the same for the MCBS. Panel A shows unconditional means, whereas
panel B shows means for respondents who report non-zero premia. In general, the weighted and unweighted
means are quite similar: the largest diﬀerences appear in the unconditional means for the MEPS.
Column 1 of panel A shows that the HRS measure of insurance premia is not stable over time. There is a
signiﬁcant jump in reported insurance premia in 2002. Column 2 shows that the jump in 2002 is not an artifact
of changes in sample composition. Although the MCBS data also show a jump in insurance premia in 2002, the
jump is much smaller than in the HRS. Moreover, prior to 2002 insurance premia in the HRS are well below
premia in the MCBS, whereas after 2002 the insurance premia reported in the two data sets are similar.
Panel B shows that oncewe restrict the sample to thosewith positive premia, the jump in themean insurance
premium between 2000 and 2002 becomesmuch smaller. It seems that much of the jump in insurance payments
is due to the fact that we drop respondents who answer DK or RF, the majority of which can be imputed after
the introduction of unfolding brackets in 2002.
The MEPS data on insurance premia information begin in 2002. Like the HRS, the MEPS uses self-reports
to measure insurance premia. The MEPS also employs reporting procedures that are in many ways similar to
the HRS. Panel A shows that the insurance premia reported in the MEPS data are smaller than the insurance
premia reported in the HRS or MCBS. Panel B shows, however, that conditional on being positive, insurance
premia in the MEPS are similar to those in the HRS. This suggests that the fraction of people with positive
insurance premia is underreported in MEPS. That the HRS insurance premia are close to those in the MCBS in
panel A is reassuring, although panel B shows that conditional on positive spending, spending in the HRS is
higher.
Table 2 shows the same data as Table 1, but for the population aged 55–64. Because the MCBS is only rep-
resentative of the age-65+ population, we omit it from this table. As in Table 1, insurance premia in the MEPS
are below the insurance premia in the HRS in panel A, but very close in panel B. Also as in Table 1, in panel
A there is a large jump in the HRS measure of insurance premia between 2000 and 2002, and the jump shrinks
– in this case disappears – in panel B. More generally, the HRS-measured premia tend to ﬂuctuate over time.
Weighting has little eﬀect on the estimated average insurance premia. Although the age composition of the
sample changes slightly over time, with the aging of the sample and the addition of new cohorts in 1998, 2004,
and 2010, these changes in sample composition are not large enough to explain the observed changes in the
measured insurance premia.
Table 2: Insurance Premia for Age 55–64, Comparison.
Year HRS data MEPS data
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Panel A: Means, unconditional (whole population)
 1996 987 1040 –
 1998 854 876 –
 2000 1129 1176 –
 2002 1755 1742 1066 1229
 2004 2050 2079 1262 1443
 2006 1974 2030 1269 1508
 2008 2193 2313 1261 1423
 2010 2046 2488 1414 1717
 2012 1877 2370 1422 1626
Panel B: Means, conditional on positive premia spending
 1996 2399 2452 –
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 1998 2143 2136 –
 2000 2776 2803 –
 2002 2962 2889 2824 2938
 2004 3369 3297 3280 3342
 2006 3264 3268 3193 3341
 2008 3632 3672 3134 3246
 2010 3836 4059 3459 3713
 2012 3616 3911 3459 3650
Panel C: Std. deviations, conditional on positive premia spending
 1996 3143 3017 –
 1998 2349 2307 –
 2000 5559 5535 –
 2002 2743 2673 3158 3265
 2004 3131 3115 3554 3675
 2006 2696 2737 3286 3461
 2008 4171 3866 3395 3416
 2010 5278 5118 3585 3900
 2012 3595 3786 3941 4072
Means and standard deviations of annual insurance premia, 2014 dollars, excluding Medicare HMO and long-term care insurance
premia.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the standard deviation of insurance premia, by year, conditional on insurance
premia being positive. The standard deviations are broadly similar across the HRS and MEPS data, apart from
a couple of years in which the standard deviations are higher in the HRS. However, this year-to-year variation
in the standard deviation of insurance premia is due to a small number of outliers in theHRS data. For example,
whenwe top code the insurance premia at $50,000, the standard deviation for theHRSweighted sample in 2010
falls from $5118 to $4113 which is much closer to the MEPS value. The MEPS insurance premia data, having
already been processed by the data providers, lack these outliers. This fact emphasizes another issue with the
HRS data: because the data are unprocessed, the researcher must make their own decisions about issues such
as how to deal with outliers.
Overall, the discrepancies between the surveys are not trivial. We are not sure about the sources of the
discrepancies, or which survey should be trusted the most. All three surveys (HRS, MEPS, and MCBS) rely on
self-reported insurance premia, and it is not obvious which survey does the best job of measuring premia.
Table 1 and Table 2 show that when we use the full sample (panel A) the HRS measure of insurance premia
jumps in 2002, and remains high thereafter. Table 1 shows that the size of the jump decreases when we restrict
the sample to people with positive premia (panel B), and in Table 2 the jump vanishes. It is thus likely that
much of the diﬀerence is due to the introduction of the unfolding brackets in HRS wave 6, which signiﬁcantly
reduced non-response. However, panel B of Table 1 still displays a jump, and panel B of Table 2 shows that
the mean premium ﬂuctuated more in the waves prior to 2002. We believe that these diﬀerences are due to
diﬀerences in the wording of the HRS questions.
Although the HRS uses roughly the same insurance premia categories for wave 6 (2002) and beyond as in
waves 3-5, there are diﬀerences in how the questions are asked. In earlierwaves, individualswere askedwhether
the amount paid for insurance per periodwas (1) per year, (2) quarterly/every 3months, (3) bimonthly/every 2
months, (4) permonth, (5) week, (6) biweekly/every 2weeks, (7) semi-annually/2 times per year, or (8) “other.”
For 2002 and beyond, respondentswere asked to reportmedical spending on amonthly basis. Allowing a choice
of reporting period in the earlier waves appears to have led to less accurate answers.
Table 3 shows mean annual insurance premia for those with employer-provided insurance, by reporting
period, in wave 4 (1998). We construct annual premia by multiplying the reported per-period premia by the
number of reporting periods in a year: e.g. by 4 if they self-reported paying quarterly, 6 if they reported bi-
monthly, and so forth. The table shows that mean annual payments vary greatly across the reporting periods.
In particular, the option “bimonthly” has an unusually low average annual premium, of $787. It is possible that
some respondents are confused as to whether they are reporting twice a month or every 2 months. Further-
more, mean payments for those reporting weekly are extremely high, at $2627. This is caused by the 1.4% of the
sample who reported weekly insurance premia of over $500 per week ($26,000 per year). For most years, this
has only amodest eﬀect on samplemeans. For example, topcoding at $15,000 reducesweightedmean insurance
premia in 2008 for 55–64 year olds from $2313 to $2238.
Table 3:Mean Annual Employer Provided Insurance Premia for Those with Employer Provided Insurance, 2014 Dollars,
by Wave 4 Reporting Period.
Reporting period Observations Mean annual premia
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Wave 4 (1998) Wave 4 Wave 4 Wave 5
Overall (including those
not paying for insurance)
20,130 376 392
(16) (16)




Reporting period: (70) (66)










4. Month 3225 1740 1208
(29) (80)
5. Week 427 2627 1562
(692) (249)










When we consider the same individuals in wave 5, the large diﬀerences across reporting period groups dis-
appear. For example, relative to wave 4, in wave 5 those reporting bimonthly and those reporting weekly have
average premia much closer to each other andmuch closer to the overall average for those who pay at least part
of their insurance premia. This suggests that some individuals in these groups were previously reporting ex-
penditures for the wrong intervals. As we show below, this may not be the only case of people makingmistakes
about the reporting period.
5.2 Problemswith Imputed Insurance Premia in theHRS
Although in most years, any imputations of insurance data must be done by the individual researcher, in 2002
and 2004 (waves 6 and 7) the HRS imputed insurance premia. However, we recommend the researcher im-
pute the data themselves for 2002 and 2004 as well, as the HRS imputations appear to have serious errors. In
particular, non-zero non-bracketed responses that appear to need no imputation were erroneously set to 0.
Panel A of Table 4 compares our imputed insurance premia to the HRS imputations. Our estimated mean
premia are $1397 and $1540 for waves 6 and 7, respectively. These are very diﬀerent than the HRS imputations
of $437 and $1217. In particular, there appears to be a serious problem with wave 6. As it turns out, the diﬀer-
ence between our estimates and the HRS estimates come not from diﬀerent treatments of bracketed or missing
responses, but from the HRS’s recoding of exact non-zero responses that were set to 0.
Table 4: Percentiles of Reported and Imputed Monthly Insurance Premia for Those Reporting Positive Point Values, HRS
Wave 6.
Wave 6 Wave 7
Observations Mean annual total
premia
Observations Mean annual total
premia
Panel A: Our imputation and HRS imputation comparison
 Our imputation 18,167 1397 20,129 1540
(14) (18)
 HRS imputation 18,167 437 20,129 1217
(6) (13)
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Private insurance premia Long-term care insurance premia
Self reported Imputed Self reported Imputed
Percentile HN040_1 HN040_1X HN079 HN079X
Panel B: Speciﬁc variable examples fromWave 6
 1% 0 0 0 7
 5% 16 0 14 28
 10% 30 0 44 46
 25% 69 0 100 83
 50% 130 0 203 139
 75% 228 0 1240 211
 90% 368 0 2760 300
 95% 500 0 3600 367
 99% 750 0 6000 592
 Mean 172 1 1038 165
 SD 151 20 3585 142
 Observations 7842 7842 1300 1300
HN040_1 is a monthly private plan insurance premia. HN079 is the monthly long-term care insurance premia. In wave 6 (2002) there
were a total of 18,168 observations. When comparing the imputations with the original variables, we only compare the observations
which were non-missing in the original variables. Dollar amounts are in nominal terms.
Panel B of Table 4 displays the percentiles of monthly private non-group and long-term care insurance
premia in wave 6 (2002). It shows individual self-reported values for those who gave an exact (not brack-
eted) response, and the HRS-imputed values of the same premia for the same individuals. Surprisingly, the
HRS-imputed values are very diﬀerent from the self-reports. As it turns out, every individual who gave a
self-reported non-zero response to the insurance premia question (HN040_1), but had less than three private
insurance plans (variable HN023), had their imputed insurance premia (HN040_1X) set to 0. The great majority
of all respondents had fewer than three private insurance plans and thus most respondents had their imputed
premia set to 0. We believe this represents an error in the HRS coding of the data. It appears that (possibly
accidentally) the HRS cleans the data when it seems that there is little reason to do so.
The right-hand side of panel B shows that in the case of long-term care insurance premia, most of the self-
reported non-zero responses have been revised downwards by the HRS. This could potentially be a ﬁx to in-
correct reporting, given that the premia are monthly, and the self-reported values appear too large for the
75th percentile and above. Again, this is potentially because some respondents have given annual rather than
monthly values.While some of the self-reported values appear to be implausibly high, the extent towhich these
values have been revised downwards is dramatic. Detailed documentation explaining what has been done to
the data would be especially useful in instances such as these.
We should point out that we did not ﬁnd similar issues (non-zero non-bracketed responses set to 0 in the
imputed data) with other variables.
6 Exit Interviews
One of the most novel aspects of the HRS data is that when an individual dies, a proxy respondent is given an
exit interview, providing details of death-related expenses, the health situation of the deceased prior to death,
and the disposition of the estate. To the greatest extent possible, the proxy respondents are knowledgeable
about the health, family, and ﬁnancial situation of the deceased: often the proxy is a widow, widower, child or
some other family member. Since 1998, if the disposition of the estate is not yet settled at the time of the exit
interview, the proxy respondent will be re-interviewed in the next wave, in a “post-exit” interview.
While these data are in principle a great resource to researchers, they have been used much less than data
from the core interviews. The exit data have been used to estimate late-in-life medical spending (e.g. De Nardi,
French, and Jones 2010; 2016a; De Nardi et al. 2016c; Marshall, Skinner, and McGarry 2011; French and Jones
2011), to learn about the disposition of estates (e.g. Hurd and Smith 2001), and to measure the decline in assets
near the death of a spouse (French et al. 2006). However, there is also some skepticism about the quality of these
data. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2015), in their estimates of wealth dynamics, exclude the estate data because of
concerns about their quality. There are fewer assessments of the quality of the exit data than there are of the
core data. In this section we describe how these data are constructed, and we provide some evidence on their
9
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quality. We ﬁnd the overall quality of the exit data to be high, but we also document some problems, especially
with imputations.
6.1 Medical SpendingData
We describe the medical spending data ﬁrst. As in the core interviews, questions are asked about components
of out-of-pocket spending for items such as doctor visits, hospital stays, and nursing home care. Exit interviews
tend to be shorter and less detailed than the core interviews. Furthermore, the proxy respondents may know
little about the circumstances of the deceased. This lack of knowledge can be seen in the relatively high share
of DK and RF responses in the exit data.
A good example is hospital stay spending. Table 5 shows the response rates for the hospital spending ques-
tions in the core and exit data for HRS wave 9 (2008). In the core data, 1984 of individuals had a hospital stay
not completely covered by insurance, 110 had a bill not yet settled, and 59 responses were either DK or RF. For
those individuals, 600 respondents answered DK or RF when asked to give a point value for out-of-pocket hos-
pital spending. In the exit data, 356 of the deceased had a hospital stay not completely covered by insurance, 11
had a bill not yet settled, and 38 responses were either DK or RF. Of these, 197 reported DK or RF when asked
to give a point value for out-of-pocket hospital spending. Although most respondents who initially report DK
or RF when asked for a point response later give a bracketed range, much of the data must be imputed. In
the core interview, of the 600 respondents who initially reported DK or RF, 354 respondents gave a bracketed
response greater than 0 and 454 respondents gave a bracketed response less than the maximum possible value.
In the exit data, of the 197 DK or RF responses to “how much did you pay,” 119 gave a response greater than
0 and 127 respondents gave a bracketed response less than the maximum possible value. Thus the bracketing
signiﬁcantly reduces the number of missing values generated by DK or RF responses. Nonetheless, in the exit
data a non-trivial share of the responses provide no useful information for imputation. This raises the question
of whether the exit data can be as trusted as data from the core interviews.
Table 5: Response Rates for Hospital Spending in Core and Exit Data, HRS Wave 9 (2008).
Panel A: Core data
Hospital stays covered by insurance? (LN102)
Completely Mostly/partially/not Not settled DK/RF
2707 1984 110 59




Min > 0 Min = 0 Max < 99,999,996 Max > 99,999,996*
354 245 454 145
Panel B: Exit data
Hospital stays covered by insurance? (VN102)
Completely Mostly/partially/not Not settled DK/RF
672 356 11 38




Min > 0 Min = 0 Max < 99,999,996 Max > 99,999,996*
119 78 127 70
*Max > 99,999,996 means that no maximum value was given.
Table 6 compares average out-of-pocket medical spending in the last year of life in the HRS with spending
the MCBS. The structures of the HRS and MCBS are not directly comparable, but we have chosen a spending
measure that we believe is. In the HRS we use out-of-pocket medical spending for those who died within 12
months of their last interview. In the MCBS we use out-of-pocket medical spending in the year they died. The
MCBS measure mixes together those who died in January (and so had only 1 month of spending in the year
of death) with those who died in December (and so had 12 months of spending). Similarly the HRS measure
10
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mixes those who died one month after their last interview (and so had only one month of spending) with those
who died 12 months after their last interview (and so had 12 months of spending).
Table 6:Medical Spending in Year of Death.
HRS exit data MCBS data
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Out-of-pocket medical expenditure
 Overall 8220 5662 – –
(458) (7)
 65+ population 8425 5438 5773 5182
(501) (7) (121) (22)
 Under 65
population
6990 6514 – –
(1117) (17)
The HRS sample consists of individuals who died within 12 months of their last interview, and had their exit interview conducted at
most 24 months after their death. We use the years 1996–2010. The population weights for the HRS are the RAND weights from the last
interview. Adjusted to 2014 dollars. MCBS estimates taken from De Nardi et al. (2016c).
Table 6 shows that the overall mean out-of-pocket medical expenditure in the year of death was $8220 for
the HRS sample. Once we use population weights, this decreases to $5662. The weighted means for the 65+
and under-65 populations are $5438 and $6514 respectively. The under-65 population having higher spending
in the year of death is similar to ﬁndings from the UK, where National Health Service spending in the year of
death shows that under-65s cost more in the year of death than those 65+ (Aragon, Chalkley, and Rice 2016).
Likewise, total spending on the year of death for those who die after age 65 appears lower than for other age
groups in Taiwan (Chen and Chuang 2016).
The weighted HRS and MCBS estimates are very close. This provides evidence of the quality of the HRS
exit data. The MCBS data should be of good quality because the MCBS interviews individuals multiple times
per year, and the MCBS uses administrative Medicare information in the construction of the data. The fact that
the HRS lines up so well relative to the MCBS suggests that the longer periods between interviews does not
adversely aﬀect the HRS data’s quality.
6.2 Disposition of the Estate
Up until 2000, the HRS released “Exit Imputations” ﬁles, which imputed all missing values. While our general
recommendation is that the HRS (or a similarly qualiﬁed source) providemore imputations, not fewer, we have
concerns with some of the existing imputations.
We can illustrate some of our concerns by examining questions about the disposition of the estate. Proxy
respondents in 1998 are asked: “Altogether, what was the value of (his/her) total estate?” In 2004 the question
was reﬁned slightly to “Excluding any life insurance, altogether what was the value of [her/his] total estate?”
From the wording of the question, it is not completely clear if the answer should include the value of the house.
In later waves, responses to the follow-up question “Does that include the value of the home?” show that the
largemajority of respondents included the value of the house when describing the value of the estate. There are
other issues in terms of measurement of the estate, such as whether it includes legal fees or other expenses. De
Nardi, French, and Jones (2016b) and French et al. (2006) show that at the time of death of a spouse, the value of
the estate drops signiﬁcantly, more than what can be explained from medical, burial, and other death related
expenses. For example, De Nardi, French, and Jones (2016b) ﬁnd that assets fall by $28,000 in periods when a
spouse dies (and rises a little when a spouse does not die), whereas medical spending is $13,000 (and medical
spending plus death related expenses is $20,000) in periods when a spouse dies. However, given the diﬀerences
between the structure of the asset questions asked in the core interview and the corresponding questions in the
exit interview, the quality of the match is actually quite impressive: the reported estate values seem to have
content.
Proxy respondents are asked not only about the value of the estate, but are also asked about how the estate
was divided between the spouse, children, and other people. Proxy respondents can provide information on
the percentage bequeathed to all children in at least three diﬀerent ways. First, the proxy respondent can report
the percentage of the total estate left to all children. Second, proxy respondents can report the total dollar
amount left to all children. Researchers can then divide this amount by the total value of the estate to ﬁnd
the percentage left to the children. Third, the proxy respondent can report the percentage of the total estate
11
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated








































French et al. DEGRUYTER
left to each child, which can be summed up to provide the total percentage for all children. Each of the three
approaches should result the same percentage. The equivalence of the three approaches should in principle be
valuable for constructing imputed values. However, this information is ignored in the imputations.
Table 7 uses six observations from the wave 4 (1998) exit data to highlight this issue. The ﬁrst two columns
present the houshold ID and person number (HHID and PN) for each observation. The third column presents
the answer to the question for “percent to all children.” The fourth column gives the cumulative response to
“percent to child 1,” “percent to child 2,” etc., summing over all children. Respondents only ever answered one
of these two questions. The ﬁfth column gives the imputed value of the variable shown in the third column, and
the sixth column gives the imputed value of the variable in the fourth. In principle columns 5 and 6 should be
identical, but in practice they are not – the data in column 3was not used to impute missing values in column 4,
and vice versa. For the ﬁrst observation (HHID 22816)we know that 100%of the estatewas given to the children.
This is useful information on the share given to each child. However, it was not used in the imputations, since
the imputed share given to all children is 0%.
Table 7: Example of Imputed Percentage of Inheritance Given to Children, Wave 4.
HHID PN Self reported Imputed
Q2438 ∑11u�=1u� Q2449_i Q2438X ∑
11
u�=1u� Q2449X_i
22816 10 100 – 100 0
36504 10 – 100 0 100
45805 10 – 100 0 100
82260 20 100 – 100 0
83756 10 33 – 33 94
200403 10 – 100 0 100
Q2438 is the question “percent given to children”; Q2449_i is the question “percent given to child i”; Q2438_X is the imputed “percent
given to children”; Q2449X_i is the imputed “percent given to child i.”
Turning to the entire sample, if we regress the imputed value of the percentage left to all children on the
sum of the imputed percentages left to each child, we would hope to get a coeﬀicient close to 1. Equation (1)
shows this is not the case. Instead, the slope coeﬀicient is negative when regressing the former (Q2438X) upon
the latter (Q2449X). The regression coeﬀicients (and standard errors) are:
Q2438X = 25.2− 0.23 ∗Q2449X
(1.3) (0.02)
(1)
The case just described is an example of a basic identity (the percentage of an inheritance going to each child,
summing over all children, should equal the percentage left to the children in total) that should hold, but is
not forced to hold in the HRS imputations. We recommend exploiting these “adding up” conditions in the
construction of the data. The idea of using adding-up identities in data construction is hardly new: take for
example the National Income and Product Accounts, which forces adding-up (or accounting) identities to hold.
It should be easy enough to use these identities to improve the data.
7 ComparingMCBSandAHEADData
Our ﬁnal set of exercises is to compare the out-of-pocket medical spending, Medicaid recipiency and income
measures in the AHEAD cohort of the HRS to the corresponding measures in the MCBS. Comparisons to the
MCBS are of particular interest because of the quality of theMCBS data. TheMCBS uses administrative records
to identify Medicaid recipients. Furthermore, Medicare claims data are used to help construct data on out-of-
pocket medical spending. The Appendix provides more background on the MCBS data.
Our analysis relies heavily on the work in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2016a). Whereas for the preceding
analyses we consider all age groups, here we restrict the sample to singles (over the sample period) who meet
the AHEAD age criteria (at least 70 in 1994, 72 in 1996, and so forth) and who are not working over the sample
period. We combine data from the core and exit (and post-exit) interviews.
In addition to measures of Medicaid recipiency and out-of-pocket spending, we construct a measure of per-
manent income (PI) that can be used to stratify the data. As in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2016a), our PI
measure for the AHEAD is the percentile rank of the individuals’ average (while observed) annuity income.
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Because the MCBS asks only about total income (including asset and other non-annuitized income), our mea-
sure of PI for the MCBS is the percentile rank for total income. The ﬁrst four columns of Table 8 show sample
statistics from the full AHEAD sample in the HRS while the ﬁnal three columns of the table shows sample
statistics from the MCBS sample. The ﬁrst set of statistics we compare are for total income. Total income in the
AHEAD data lines up well with total income in the MCBS data, although income in the top quintile of the
MCBS is higher than in the AHEAD. In De Nardi, French, and Jones (2016a) we compare the annuity income
quintiles of the AHEAD to the annuity income quintiles of the PSID, and ﬁnd that the match is good, including
at the top of the income distribution. Thus if anything the problems with income measurement probably lie
with the MCBS, which uses a less detailed methodology to elicit income information.
Table 8: Income, Out-of-Pocket Spending, and Medicaid Recipiency Rates, AHEAD Cohort Versus MCBS.
Income
quintile

















1 9124 5682 60.9% 3006 7957 69.9% 4774
2 12,131 9,749 28.1% 5034 11,812 41.8% 6295
3 18,273 12,850 11.0% 5953 16,198 15.5% 7627
4 22,740 16,964 5.6% 7498 23,236 8.0% 8606
5 39,587 31,004 3.0% 8252 52,047 5.4% 9455
We only use the years 1996–2010, and those who were single and age 72 and older in 1996. Adjusted to 2014 dollars.
Next we compare Medicaid recipiency rates in the AHEAD andMCBS. 61% and 70% of those in the bottom
PI quintile are on Medicaid in the AHEAD and in the MCBS, respectively. In the top quintile, 3% of people
are on Medicaid in the AHEAD, whereas 5% are in the MCBS. The MCBS may have higher Medicaid recipi-
ency rates because it has administrative information onwhether individuals are onMedicaid, which eliminates
underreporting problems. Although Table 8 suggests underreporting in the AHEAD data, it should be noted
that for many programs, under-reporting in survey data is often severe. In our opinion, the underreporting of
Medicaid participation in the AHEAD cohort is relatively modest.
Columns 4 and 7 of Table 8 show out-of-pocket medical spending. This measure includes insurance premia
(including imputed Medicare Part B premia) in both datasets. Out-of-pocket medical expenditures (including
insurance payments) average $3010 in the bottom PI quintile and $8250 in the top quintile of the AHEAD. In
comparison, the same numbers in the MCBS data are $4770 and $9460. While out-of-pocket medical spending
in theMCBS is higher than in theAHEAD, the two spendingmeasures are fairly similar. Thismay be surprising,
given the diﬀerences in survey methodology behind the twomeasures. The HRS and theMCBS each have their
own advantages relative to the other dataset. There are more detailed questions underlying the out-of-pocket
medical expense measures in the AHEAD than in the MCBS. HRS Respondents can use the unfolding brackets
to give ranges for their medical spending, while in the MCBS they must provide a point estimate or DK. The
MCBS has the advantage that unreported out-of-pocket medical expenses will be imputed if Medicare had to
pay a share of the total cost.2
Turning to cross-sectional distributions, Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of
out-of-pocket medical expenditures found in the AHEAD andMCBS data: the dashed line is the AHEADCDF,
and the dotted line is the MCBS CDF. The ﬁgure shows that, consistent with Table 8, out-of-pocket medical
spending in the MCBS is higher than in AHEAD.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses, AHEAD Data (Long Dashed Line) and MCBS Data (Short
Dashed Line).
8 Conclusion
The HRS does an excellent job constructing economic data related to the elderly population. In this paper we
assess the quality of HRS variables related to out-of-pocket medical spending and health insurance premia.
Comparing the HRSmeasures with measures from other high quality surveys show that the quality of the HRS
data is high. The data from the “exit interviews” also appear to be accurate, and we encourage researchers to
makemore use of them.Whilewemake a number of recommendations to improve the data,we stress thatwe do
not recommend any changes to the survey questionnaire. Our recommendations all pertain to post-processing
of the data. For example, while the source data are of high quality, the imputation procedures can, in some
cases, be improved. Furthermore, much of the data are not imputed at all, which limits the usability of the data
and the comparability of results across studies where the researcher is left to impute the data herself. We hope
our assessments and recommendations will help make the HRS even more useful and accessible.
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Appendix
TheMCBSandMEPSDatasets
This appendix describes the MEPS and MCBS datasets. Table 9 provides a summary comparison of these two
datasets to the HRS.
Table 9: Comparison of the HRS, MEPS and MCBS Datasets.
HRS MEPS MCBS
Data source Survey, employer and
administrative data available
for merging
Survey data matched to
provider data





Full panel, new cohorts
added as they (roughly)
reach age 50
Rotating panels, each panel
lasting 2 years




Every 2 years Every 6 months Every 4 months
Measurement
unit





Mix of in-person and other In-person In-person
Institutional
population
Not included in initial
samples, but households
followed into institutions
Not included Included (by proxy)
MCBS
We use the 1996 to 2010 waves of the Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS). The MCBS is a nationally
representative survey of disabled and elderly (age-65+) Medicare beneﬁciaries. Although the sample misses
elderly individuals who are notMedicare beneﬁciaries, virtually everyone aged 65+ is a beneﬁciary. The survey
contains an over-sample of beneﬁciaries older than 80 and disabled individuals younger than 65. We exclude
disabled individuals younger than 65, and use population weights throughout.
MCBS respondents are interviewed up to 12 times over a 4-year period, and are asked about (andmatched to
administrativeMedicare claims data on) health care utilization over 3 of the 4 years, forming panels onmedical
spending for up to 3 years. We aggregate the data to an annual level. These sample selection procedures leave
us 66,790 diﬀerent individuals who contribute 152,193 person-year observations.
The MCBS’s unit of analysis is an individual. Respondents are asked about health status, income, health
insurance, and health care expenditures paid out-of-pocket, by Medicaid, by Medicare, by private insurers,
and by other sources. The MCBS survey data are then matched to Medicare records.
A key variable of interest is medical spending. This includes the cost of hospital stays, doctor visits, pharma-
ceutical, nursing home care, and other long-term care. The MCBS’s medical expenditure measures are created
through a reconciliation process that combines survey information with administrative Medicare claims data
and Medicaid recipiency data. As a result, the MCBS contains accurate data on Medicare payments and fairly
accurate data on out-of-pocket, Medicaid, and other insurance payments. Out-of-pocket expenses include hos-
pital, doctor and other bills paid out of pocket, but does not include insurance premia paid out of pocket.
Because the MCBS includes information on people who enter a nursing home or die, its medical spending data
are very comprehensive.
As shown in De Nardi et al. (2016c), the MCBS accurately measures the share of the population receiving
Medicaid payments: theMCBSMedicaid recipiency rates of age 65+ “dual eligibles” (i.e. thosewho receive both
Medicare andMedicaid) line upwell with the aggregate statistics. TheMCBS datamatches aggregateMedicaid
recipiency rates for the age 65+ population extremely well, which should not be surprising since MCBS uses
administrative Medicaid data to create recipiency rates. However, because the MCBS does not capture those
drawing Medicaid but not Medicare, the MCBS will likely understate the aggregate Medicaid recipiency rate
by several percent. See De Nardi et al. (2016c), who analyze the MCBS data in detail.
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MEPS
We use data from the 1996 to 2012 waves of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS is a
nationally representative survey. Respondents are asked about health status, health insurance, and health care
expenditures paid out-of-pocket, by Medicaid, by Medicare, private insurers and by other sources. The MEPS
data are matched to information provided by providers. Although it does not capture certain types of medical
expenditures, such as nursing home expenditures, it captures most of the sources of medical spending that are
faced by individuals in their 1950s and 1960s. See Sing et al. (2006) and Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2016)
for more on comparisons between the MEPS data and the aggregate statistics.
MEPS respondents are interviewed up to 5 times over a 2 year period, forming short panels. We aggregate
the data to an annual level. We use the same sample selection rules for the MEPS that we use for the HRS. See
French, von Gaudecker, and Jones (2016), who analyze MEPS data in detail.
Notes
1Unfolding brackets were introduced to the HRS by Tom Juster, who adapted them from the Consumer Finance Survey. We are grateful
to the editor for this bit of institutional history.
2Fahle, McGarry, and Skinner (2016) ﬁnds average out-of-pocket medical spending, excluding insurance premia, is $2626 for the age
65+ population, whereas De Nardi et al. (2016c) ﬁnd that out-of-pocket spending for the same group is $2740. The estimates in Table 8 are
higher because the sample are an older group of individuals, with higher medical spending.
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